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PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY
XXI. Charles Doe (1830-1896)
FRANK R. KENISON
The author was a Justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire from 1946 to
1952 and Chief Justice since that time. He was admitted to the bar in 1932. Beginning
with 1935 he has served successively as a County Solicitor in his state, as Assistant
Attorney General, and as Attorney General for the State of New Hampshire, prior
to assuming the office of Justice of the Supreme Court. He is a member of the American
and New Hampshire Bar Associations, The American Judicature Society, and the
American Law Institute -- EDITOR.
The tides of judicial history some-
times exhibit a strange faculty of
ignoring their chief benefactors.' A
classical example is Charles Doe who
at the age of twenty-nine, was ap-
pointed Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of New Hampshire and
served in that capacity from 1859 to
1874, and as chief justice from 1876
until his death on March 9, 1896.2
Probably not more than six judges in A
the United States and England have
had a longer judicial career and none ,
of them contributed as much to the z,
advancement and improvement of .w-
the administration of justice and the
judicial machinery to accomplish it
expeditiously.'
While Doe's contributions are fre-
quently overlooked, it is significant
that those most qualified to judge his ('i \RLFS Do.
work have recognized that he was "one of the great judges of the last
1 Cf. ABRAH M. John 3farshall Harlan; .A Justice Neglecled, 41 V x. L. RF%. 871, 872, 890 (1955).
2 ELMER E. DOE, The Descendants of Nicholas Doe, 230 250 (1918); Charles Doe, 5 Dictionary,
Am. Biog. 354 (1930).
3 HENING, Charles Doe. in 8 GREAT A-IERICAN LAWvERs 24t. 243, 317 (Lt;wis ed. 1909.
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century,". "a great name in American Law"' and one of "the ten judges who must
be ranked first in American judicial history. '8 Wigmore's monumental Treatise on
Evidence was dedicated to Charles Doe and James Bradley Thayer "Two Masters
in the Law of Evidence,"7 and Jeremiah Smith has written convincingly of Doe's
ability to decide cases on their merits and not permit justice to be "strangled in the
net of form."8 A more recent note has concluded that although Doe had "left a
permanent impression on American jurisprudence ... surprisingly little has been
written about Doe either during his lifetime or since his death in 1896."1 Wigmore
had no hesitation in expressing his opinion that Doe was "one of the greatest of
American judges."10 Nor is modem authority from a respected source lacking since
Professor Edmund M. Morgan, an indefatigable leader in the field of reform in the
law of evidence, refers to the classic opinions of "the great justice Doe of New Hamp-
shire." 1
Within the limits of the few pages allotted to the title of this comment, it is pos-
sible only to take a birds-eye view of Doe the man, and his contributions as a judge
to a more enlightened consideration of insanity and the criminal law. While Doe's
substantial accomplishments in the field of evidence and procedure are the ones
that may be remembered today,u it is the purpose of this comment to consider his
single-handed and original contribution in making medical science the handmaiden
of criminal law in its application to mental disorder. It is believed that Doe's early
efforts prior to 1872 in that direction are just beginning to receive modem considera-
ation. It may well be he is the only judge, excluding contemporaries,14 who can
truly be denominated a pioneer in criminology.
I RoscoE POUND, INTERPRETATiNs OF LEGAL HISTORY 108 (1923).
5 CHARLES FAIM.N, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L.
REv. 5, 86 (1949).
6 POUND, FORmATIVE ERA OF AmERICAN LAW. 4 and n.2, 30-31 (1938).
7 1 WVi O o, EvIDEN E V (1904).
8J. S-Tnn, Memoir of Charles Doe, 2 PRoc. So. N. H. BAR Ass'N, 125, 144 (1899); Note 9 HAv.
L. R v. 534 (1896).
9 Note, DOE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE: RErLEcTIONS ON A NINETEENTI CENTURY JUDGE, 63 HARv.
L. R:v. 513 (1950). In addition to the references cited in this note, see also, S3 ALBANY L. J. 161
(1896); 27 Am. L. REV. 71 (1893); 30 Am. L. REv. 286 (1896); 3 PARER, COURTS AND LAWYERS
or NEW ENGLAND 573 (1931); WmHOFEN, The Flowering of New Hampshire, in Sy'wosrom ON
INSA T-IY AND T= CRImINAL LAW, 22 U. CmI. L. Rxv. 356, 363 (1955).
10 2 WimoMRE, EViDENcE (3rd ed.) (1940) s. 445, p. 433.
" 1 BASIC PROBLEMS OF EvIDENcE, pp. 26, 172 (1954).
12 "There can scarcely be a single Harvard Law School man here who has not heard of the great
Chief Justice commonly known as "C. Doe of New Hampshire." He died as long ago as 1896, but
he had the fire and he had the learning and the practical common sense which made him, wholly
without aid from the Legislature of New Hampshire, the great leader in the improvement of the
administration of justice in that state. Full of whimsies and sometimes as eccentric as a March
Hare, he was imbued with the spirit of justice and fought for it all his life, fought for it in the hard,
practical, matter-of-fact way that one would expect from a native of New Hampshire." Quoted
from an address by JUDGE HAROLD R. MEDINA to the members of the Pennsylvania Bar, appearing
in 36 JouR. oF THE AmaaR. Jun. SoC., 8 (June 1952).
'a Durham vs. United States (D. C. Cir.), 214 F. (2d) 862 (1954).
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Charles Doe was born in Derry, New Hampshire on April 11, 1830. His father, a
large landowner and well known in the community, sent his son to the academies
of South Berwick, Exeter and Andover, and one term at Harvard College from which
he transferred to Dartmouth where he graduated in 1849. After one term at the
Harvard Law School he returned to New Hampshire to become county solicitor for
Strafford county. From 1854 until his appointment as an associate justice of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire on September 23, 1859, he was engaged in a
substantial trial practice, both criminal and civil.' 5 During this period he took an
active interest in politics, first as a Democrat and later as a Republican, and made
many friends and acquired an equal number of enemies.
Although Doe was financially independent, he lived simply, dressed as a country
storekeeper or farmer rather than a judge of his era and was a thorough believer in
fresh air.'6 A typical comment was that he "was a man of simple tastes and eccen-
tric manners, but of genuine legal talents and clear and impartial mind." There is
not the slightest doubt that Doe was individualistic in thought and action but there
is reason to believe that references to his eccentricities have been exaggerated. He
was stem with cant, impatient with ceremony unless he conceived it fulfilled some
essential function 8 and was unawed by precedent unless it appeared to have a logi-
cal basis.' 9 It remains for someone to make a more adequate study of his life before
we can say with certainty whether his thoughts were unique or whether their ex-
pression may be classed as eccentric20 However, the most recent evaluation of Doe
confirms earlier opinions that his "treatment of substantive problems sometimes
showed an almost unique originality."2' 1 Doe's originality did not go unnoticed and
it was inevitable that in addition to criticism there would also be parody. In a
humorous sketch before a Bar Association Doe C. J. is pictured as rendering a
certain decision and giving as his sole reason "that the law has hitherto always
been understood to be otherwise.""
Doe first gave serious thought to the problem of mental disorder in his dissenting
consideration of contemporary criminologists. "We confess to having been arbitrary in that we have
selected no contemporary criminologist for inclusion in this series." 45 J. CRim. L., C. & P. S. 1
(1954).
15 See HENMG, supra, note 3, at 245: "'We have been over the dockets again very carefully,
and we feel sure that Charles Doe's name appeared as counsel in two hundred twenty-three different
cases up to the time of his appointment to the bench.' Letter to writer from W. H. Roberts, clerk
of Superior Court, 1906."
16 "Judge Doe was eccentric in manner, dress and mode of living and was a confirmed believer in
fresh air... Lawyers declare that to attend court in winter, when the chief justice presided, was
equal to a trip to the Arctic regions." 53 ALBANTY L. J. 161 (1896).
17 20 GRA iTE MONTHLY, 275 (1896).
18 EASTMAN, Chief-Jiulice Doc, 9 GREEN BAG 245, 250 (1897).
19Metcalf v. Gilmore, 59 N. H. 417, 433 (1879): "As there was a time when there were no com-
mon-law precedents, everything that can be done with them could be done without them."
20 John Reid, Esq. of Dover, N. H. is presently engaged in a careful and exhaustive study of all
the existing material on Doe. In view of the inadequate material which exists today, students of
Doe will welcome Reid's work as filling a void in American judicial biography.
2163 HARV. L. Rxv. 513, 518 (1950), supra, note 9.
22 J. Smr, Memoir of Charles Doe, 2 P1oc. So. N. H. BAR Ass'N, 125, 149 (1897).
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opinion in Boardman v. Woodman. This was a will case in which the majority held
that witnesses who were not experts and were not witnesses to the will could not
testify as to the sanity of the testator. Doe objected to the majority ruling which
affirmed instructions that delusions were the test of insanity. It was in his view that
this was a question of fact for the jury and not a question of law for the court to
instruct the jury. A summary of some "of his most forcible sentences"24 appear at
page 150 of the opinion: "If it is necessary that the law should entertain a single
medical opinion concerning a single disease, it is not necessary that that opinion
should be a cast-off theory of physicians of a former generation. That cannot be a
fact in law, which is not a fact in science; that cannot be health in law, which is
disease in fact. And it is unfortunate that courts should maintain a contest with
science and the laws of nature, upon a question of fact which is within the province
of science and outside the domain of our law. All inconsistencies and difficulties are
avoided by adhering to the spirit and elementary principles of the law, which de-
clare that a will cannot be produced by any form of mental disease, and that the
indications and tests of menial disease are matters of fact."
In State v. Pike, Doe's views prevailed and the decision affirmed the following
instructions to the jury: -5 "that whether there is such a mental disease as dipso-
mania, and whether defendant had that disease, and whether the killing of Brown
was the product of such disease, were questions of fact for the jury." In amplifica-
tion of his criticism of the prevailing right and wrong test, Doe contended that it
was an unsuccessful attempt "to install old exploded medical theories.in the place
of facts established in the progress of scientific knowledge" 6 "If our precedents
practically established old medical theories which science has rejected, and abso-
lutely rejected those which science has established, they might at least claim the
merit of formal consistency. But the precedents require the jury to be instructed in
the new medical theories by experts, and in the old medical theories by the judge." -"
(pp. 438-439).
In State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 398 (1871) a unanimous court rejected the M'Nagh-
ten Rules28 and adopted Doe's theory that criminal responsibility was a question of
fact for the jury. If the defendant had a mental disease and the criminal act was a
product of that mental disease, the jury was to acquit the defendant. The jury in
the Jones case was given the same instructions that were used in State v. Pike and
these instructions were upheld as correct: "If the defendant killed his wife in a
manner that would be criminal and unlawful if the defendant were sane, the verdict
should be 'not guilty by reason of insanity,' if the killing was the offspring or prod-
uct of mental disease in the defendant." Under the New Hampshire rule there is no
legal test of insanity and the issue of criminal responsibility is a question of fact to
be decided by the jury upon all the evidence presented to them including that of
- N. H. 120, 140 (1866).
249 HARv. L. Rlv. 534, 535 (1896).
25 49 N. H. 399, 407-408 (1869).
- ibid. p. 438.
27 ibid. pp. 438-439.
28 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 ENG. REP. 718, 722 (H. L. 1843).
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the experts.P "Whether the defendant had a mental disease, as before remarked,
seems to be as much a question of fact as whether he had a bodily disease; and
whether the killing of his wife was the product of that disease, was also as clearly a
matter of fact as whether thirst and a quickened pulse are the product of fever.
That it is a difficult question does not change the matter at all."
For many years it has been well known in New Hampshire that Doe not only
inspired many decisions but in some cases actually wrote decisions although they
appeared under the name of another judge.30 Dr. Reik has demonstrated clearly
Judge Doe's part in the opinion by Judge Ladd in State v. Jones, and Doe's attempt
to give credit to his colleagues rather than himself in establishing the New Hamp-
shire rule on insanity." Judge Doe owed a great debt to Dr. Isaac Ray who is gen-
erally regarded as an American pioneer in forensic psychiatry.2 "As we have seen,
Ray had long taken the position that the criteria of intellectual comprehension of
right and wrong laid down in the M'Naghten Rules are wholly inadequate, and that,
indeed, no legal definition or universally applicable test of criminal irresponsibility
by reason of insanity can be devised. Judge Doe was thoroughtly convinced that
Ray was right, although he hesitated to quote Ray as his authority, preferring to
confine his arguments to purely legal grounds. He concluded that 'the great masters
of our law' never made the distinction between law and fact in cases of insanity,
and that by setting up various theoretical criteria for legal responsibility they not
only invaded the realm of science but also betrayed the spirit of the common law."' '
Long before Cardozoe and Pound had made forceful pleas for the necessity of
integrating law and science, Doe was the first judge to insist that the law should
collaborate with science and particularly in the field of criminal responsibility. 5
Even able commentators who think that the N''Naghten Rules should be retained
with some modification would agree with Doe that we should continue to find a
way to integrate the progress of medical science with the development of the law
of mental disorder.3 6
In 1953 the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment issued its report
after a five-year study. It recommended that the present legal tests of insanity be
abolished and that the jury be allowed to decide whether the defendant was suffering
29 A summary of the New Hampshire rule including the authorities that support it and criticize
it may be found in WETHOPEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRnaNAL DEFENSE. pp. 113-119 (1954).
30 See HENING, supra, note 3, at 304; 63 HARV. L. REv. 513, 514, supra, note 9.
31 RiiK, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the Jurisprudence of .3fcntal
Disease. 63 YALE L. J. 145 (1953).
2 OVERHOLSER, PIoNEERS IN CRIMNOLOGY: III ISAAc RAY (1807-1881) 45 J. CRIm. L., C. &
P. S. 249, 261-262 (1954).
= See note 32, supra.
4 CARDozo, WHAT MEDIcNE CAN Do FOR THE LAW 32 (1930).
35 See REK, supra, note 31 at 196: "As to the New Hampshire rule itself, we can only conclude
from the correspondence here presented that if it deals with matters too complicated for juries to
decide unassisted, it nevertheless seeks to open the way for scientific progress in the jurisprudence of
mental disease, and marks a step toward true collaboration between science and the law in the
spirit of Judge Doe and Dr. Ray."
36 HALL, Psychiatry au Crininal Responsibilty, 65 YALE L. J. 761, 768-785 (May 1956).
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from such a mental disease or deficiency that "he ought not to be held responsible."7
At long last the voice of Doe, the first judge who was a pioneer in criminology, at
least received modem consideration for the views which he had expressed almost a
century ago08 In 1954 the Durham case" decided "that an accused is not crimi-
nally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
defect." While it did not give credit to Doe's pioneer efforts in this field, it did state
that the "rule we now hold... is not unlike that followed by the New Hampshire
court since 1870." Both the Durham case and the New Hampshire rule have been
defended 0 as well as criticized.41 "What is the reason for the sudden attention now
being shown to Judge Doe's octogenarian wallflower? Is the happening of the Dur-
ham case and the Royal Commission's report within a year of each other mere coin-
cidence? I am inclined to think not. Rather, these developments seem to me a vin-
dication of Professor George Dession's prophecy made in 1938, that 'the infiltration
of psychiatry-and all psychiatrists into the administration of criminal law' will
one day be recognized as 'overshadowing all other contemporary phenomena' in
its influence on the evolution of criminal justice."4
The American Law Institute is preparing a Model Penal Code and while it does
not adopt the New Hampshire rule it is at least encouraging to note that the M'Nagh-
ten Rules are undergoing reconsideration in the light of modem medical science.4
Whether one favors the New Hampshire rule, the Durham rule or whether one be-
lieves that greater progress would be made by the recommendations of the British
Royal Commission or the American Law Institute is not material in achieving the
real objective of integrating law and medicine in the light of modem knowledge.
Improvements will be made even if we follow those psychiatrists who believe there
is much merit in the M'Naghten Rules providing that they can be brought up to date
in the light of modem scientific developments.44
Doe recognized that the legal profession would not adopt medical science as law
and that the only solution was to adopt "the venerable principle of the common law"
that questions of medical science be left to the jury as questions of fact5 While Doe
was convinced that the antagonism between medical science and law could be re-
37 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMUSSION ON CAPITAL PUNISMENT (1949-1953), Cmd. No. 8932 at
116 (1953).
38 STOCKLY, Mental Disorders and Criminal Responsibility: The Recommendations of the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment, 33 TEX. L. REv. 482, 485-486 (1955): "Nearly a hundred
years ago, under the leadership of Judge Doe, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, believing that
then-used tests of responsibility (the M'Naghten Rules and the irresistible impulse test) were in-
effectual, held that the question of an accused's responsibility was for the jury without reference to
any test other than an inquiry whether he had acted with a criminal intent."
39 Durham v. United States, 214 F.(2d)862, 874-875 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
40 SOBELOFF, Insanity and the Criminal Law: from McNaghten to Durham, and beyond, 41
A. B. A. J. 793 (1955).
41 HALL, supra, note 36.
4 DxssioN, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice. 47 YALE L. J. 319 (1938). WI-
11OFEN, Tle Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 356, 363 (1955).
43 AmEaicAN LAW INsTiTUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE, tentative draft No. 4 Sec. 4.01 (1955).
4W4ERTHAM, Psychoaudhoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CM. L. REV. 336 (1955).
45 REin, supra, note 31 at 193.
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moved, "my fear is very strong that it can be done within 100 years on no other
basis than the principle which I have undertaken to establish. .. ."16 Perhaps in
1969, Doe's prophecy may come true but in any event he would be the first to admit
that any improvement on the traditional tests for insanity would be a major gain in
criminal law even if his method was not adopted. We have already alluded to the fact
that Doe was particularly impatient with sham and cant and he would probably
agree with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statements before the British Royal Commis-
sion on Capital Punishment: "I am a great believer in being as candid as possible
about my institutions. They are in a large measure abandoned in practice, and there-
fore I think the M'Naghten Rules are in a large measure shams.... I dare to believe
that we ought not to rest content with the difficulty of finding an improvement in
the M'Naghten Rules."" While Doe's contribution to the difficult problem of crim-
inal responsibility is not the only solution, at least it was "a tangible solution in an
area where the law has long been criticized for inertia."' s
One may not agree with Doe's views on criminal responsibility and yet concede
that he was the first judge in America who can be rated as a pioneer in criminology.
46 See Doe's letter of March 23, 1869 to Dr. Ray quoted in RlaK, supra, note 31 at 194.
4 Note 37, supra, at 102.48 Criminal Responsibilily and Mental Disorder: New Approaches to an Old Problem, 30 IND. L. 3.
194, 217 (1955). While the quoted statement was made with reference to the Durham decision it is
equally applicable to the New Hampshire rule.
19561
